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Holmes v. State:
TRIAL JUDGE'S
FAILURE TO
PERMIT PRO SE
DEFENDANT TO
PRESENT CLOSING
AR GUMENT
IS NOT
HARMLESS ERROR.
In Holmes v. State, 333 Md.
652, 637 A.2d 113 (1994), the
Court of Appeals of Maryland
ruled that a trial judge's failure to
allow an unrepresented defendant
to present closing argument at a
bench trial was not harmless error.
In so ruling, the court upheld apro
se defendant's constitutional right
to present a closing argument be-
fore verdict.
Daniel C. Holmes ("Holmes')
was charged with several drug re-
lated offenses including possession
with the intent to distribute, pos-
session of cocaine, drug traffick-
ing with a firearm, and carrying a
concealed handgun. He was also
charged with auto theft and the
unauthorized use of an automo-
bile. At his bench trial in the Cir-
cuit Court for Baltimore County,
he was unrepresented by counsel.
When the State rested its case, the
court asked the defendant if he
wished to take the stand or to re-
main silent. After Holmes replied
that he would like to say a few
words on his behalf, the court in-
formed him that while he did not
have to take the stand, he would
still have the opportunity to ad-
dress the court. Holmes told the
judge that he did not want to take
the stand. The judge then informed
the defendant that he found him
guilty of possession of cocaine,
intent to distribute, and the unau-
thorized use of an automobile. Af-
ter reaching its verdict, the judge
then allowed Holmes to address the
court. At this time, Holmes denied
handling the cocaine and having
knowledge that the car was stolen.
The court then announced the sen-
tence.
Holmes appealed to the Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland
which affirmed the trial judge's
verdict. On appeal to the Court of
Appeals ofMaryland, Holmes con-
tended that the trial court erred in
denying him the right to present
closing argument and his request
for a postponement of the trial until
he could obtain counsel.
The court of appeals began its
analysis by rejecting the State's
argument that Holmes waived his
right to present closing argument.
The court determined that although
Holmes did not want to testify, the
fact that he desired to "say a few
things in [his] behalf" made it evi-
dentto the trial court thathe wanted
to argue his case and vocalize his
innocence. Holmes, 333 Md. 652,
657,637A.2d113, 116(1994). In
addition, the trial judge had as-
sured Holmes of the opportunity to
address the court. Id. As a result,
the court stated that "[b]ecause
Holmes made a specific request to
argue, his failure expressly to ob-
ject did not constitute a waiver of
his right to argue nor did it serve to
preclude the preservation of the
issue for appellate review."
Holmes, 333 Md. at 658,637 A.2d
at 116.
Next, the court of appeals held
that the defendant had a constitu-
tional right to present closing argu-
ment. Relying on Herring v. New
York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975) for
support, the court ofappeals opined
that the right to present closing
argument was a fundamental con-
stitutional right that applied equally
topro se defendants and those rep-
resented by counsel. The court also
noted that the right was applicable
even in cases where the evidence
against the defendant was "over-
whelming." Holmes, 333 Md. at
658, 637 A.2d at 116. In Herring,
the Supreme Court noted that
"[s]ome cases may appear to the
trial judge to be simple - open and
shut-- at the close of the evidence.
... But... there will be cases where
closing argument may correct a
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premature misjudgment and avoid
an otherwise erroneous verdict."
Id., (quoting Herring, 422 U.S. at
863 (1975)). Additionally, the court
of appeals relied on Spence v. State,
in which it stated that:
IT]he opportunity for sum-
mation by defense counsel prior
to verdict in a non-jury trial as
well as in ajury trial is a basic
constitutional right guaranteed
by Article 21 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights and the
Sixth Amendmentto the United
States Constitution as applied
to the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Spence, 296Md.
416, 419, 463 A.2d 808, 809
(1983).
The court of appeals therefore held
that Holmes had been denied his
constitutional right to present clos-
ing argument, noting that the re-
marks Holmes made at the trial
"were certainly not simply allocu-
tion in mitigation of punishment"
but were his best attempt to argue
his case to the judge. Holmes, 333
Md. at 657-58, 637 A.2d at 116.
Further, the court held that although
the trial judge assured Holmes that
he would have an opportunity to
address the court, that opportunity
was not afforded until after the
rendering of the verdict. The court
found the error was not harmless.
Holmes, 333 Md. at 659,637 A.2d
at 117.
Because the case was reversed
on this ground, it was unnecessary
for the court to reach Holmes' sec-
ond contention, that the trial court
erred in not granting a postpone-
ment to allow the defendant to ob-
tain counsel. The court of appeals
remanded the case to the trial court
for a new trial.
The court's holding in Holmes
reaffirms its position that pro se
defendants have a constitutional
right to present closing arguments
and ensures thatthey will be granted
this opportunity to express their
views and make final arguments in
their defenseprior to verdict. More-
over, this case forces judges to
honor all defendants their right of
allocution that is guaranteed by the
United States Constitution and the
Maryland Declaration of Rights.
- Erika F. Daneman
Nobelman v. American
Savings Bank:
DEBTOR WHO FILES
FOR BANKRUPTCY
UNDER CHAPTER 13
OF THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE
MAY NOT REDUCE
AN UNDERSECURED
HOMESTEAD
MORTGAGE TO THE
FAIR MARKET
VALUE OF THE
MOR TGA GED
RESIDENCE.
In Nobelman v. American Sav-
ings Bank, 113 S. Ct. 2106 (1993),
the United States Supreme Court
held that a debtor who files for
bankruptcy under Chapter 13 of
the Bankruptcy Code may not re-
duce an undersecured homestead
mortgage to the fair market value
of the mortgaged residence. Bifur-
cation of an undersecured home-
stead mortgagee's claim into se-
cured and unsecured portions im-
permissibly modifies the rights of
the mortgagee. In so holding, the
Court resolved a conflict among
the courts of appeals in interpret-
ing sections 506(a) and 1322(b)(2).
In 1984, Petitioners Leonard
and Harriet Nobelman obtained a
loan of $68,250 from Respondent
American Savings Bank for the
purchase of a condominium which
was to be used as their principal
residence. Petitioners executed an
adjustable rate note payable to the
bank which was secured by a deed
of trust on the residence. By 1990,
Petitioners had fallen behind intheir
mortgage payments, and they
sought relief under Chapter 13 of
the Bankruptcy Code ("Code").
The bank filed a proof of claim
with the Bankruptcy Court for
$71,335, which represented the
principal, interest, and fees owed
on the note. However, Petitioners'
Chapter 13 plan valued the resi-
dence at only $23,500, an amount
not disputed by the parties, and
proposed to make payments pur-
suant to the mortgage contract only
up to that amount. Petitioners
sought to treat the remainder of the
claim as unsecured. Creditors with
Sunsecured claims would receive
nothing under the plan.
Respondents American Sav-
ings Bank and the Chapter 13
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